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Single Idea 5485
[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
]
Full Idea
Emeralds cannot all turn blue in 2050 (as Nelson Goodman envisaged), because to do so they would have to have an extrinsically variable nature.
Clarification
'Extrinsically' here means imposed from the outside
Gist of Idea
Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue
Source
Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' [Acumen 2002], p.137
A Reaction
I was never very impressed by the 'grue' problem, probably for this reason, but also because Goodman probably thought predicates and properties are the same thing, which they aren't (Idea 5457).
Related Idea
Idea 5457
Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [Ellis, by PG]
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[problem of a predicate which changes over time]:
17646
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Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form
[Goodman, by Putnam]
|
18749
|
Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised
[Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
|
17655
|
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely
[Goodman]
|
16933
|
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science
[Quine]
|
17675
|
Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change
[Armstrong]
|
17683
|
Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal
[Armstrong]
|
5485
|
Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue
[Ellis]
|
15887
|
'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour
[Harré]
|
15888
|
The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science
[Harré]
|
15096
|
'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green
[Shoemaker]
|
8556
|
Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential
[Shoemaker]
|
9652
|
To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable
[Lewis]
|
4783
|
Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary
[Mautner, by PG]
|
3760
|
Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used
[Bernecker/Dretske]
|
14989
|
Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature
[Sider]
|
14997
|
Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things
[Sider]
|
6738
|
Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates
[Bird]
|
6739
|
Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses
[Bird]
|
6799
|
We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds
[Bird]
|
7296
|
'Grue' is not a colour
[Milsted]
|