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Full Idea
In machine functionalism, pain tokens (individual instances of pain) are identical with particular neurophysiological states, but pain itself, the kind, universal, or 'type', can be identified only with something more abstract.
Clarification
A one pound coin is one 'token' of a general 'type'
Gist of Idea
Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract
Source
report of Hilary Putnam (The Mental Life of Some Machines [1967]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.6
Book Ref
'Mind and Cognition (2nd Edn)', ed/tr. Lycan,William [Blackwell 1999], p.6
A Reaction
This is where the "what is it like?" question seems important. Pain doesn't seem like a physical object, or an abstract idea. Personally I think the former is more likely to be correct than the latter. Causation by pain is not like causation by gravity.
| 23225 | The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie] |
| 3192 | Basic logic can be done by syntax, with no semantics [Gödel, by Rey] |
| 5495 | Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan] |
| 2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
| 5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
| 12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
| 2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
| 6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
| 5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan] |