more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 5497

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism ]

Full Idea

For Davidson, mental types are individuated by considerations that are nonscientific, distinctly humanistic, and part normative, so will not coincide with any types that are designated in scientific terms.

Clarification

'Normative' means it creates and follows rules

Gist of Idea

Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative

Source

report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.8

Book Ref

'Mind and Cognition (2nd Edn)', ed/tr. Lycan,William [Blackwell 1999], p.8


A Reaction

I just don't believe this, mainly because I don't accept that there is a category called 'nonscientific'. All we are saying is that a brain is a hugely complicated object, and we don't properly understand its operations, though we relate to it very well.


The 13 ideas from 'Mental Events'

Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]