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Single Idea 5513

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity ]

Full Idea

Kant thought that personal identity could not simply consist in sameness of consciousness, since someone's consciousness might be qualitatively similar to that of someone else who had existed previously.

Gist of Idea

Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough

Source

comment on John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason

Book Ref

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Martin,R /Barresi,J [Blackwells 2003], p.60

A Reaction

An interesting point, which leads to the question of whether two conscious events must by type-identical or token-identical to confer identity over time. Locke implies type- (which leads to Kant's objection). He needed, but couldn't have, token-.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [criticisms the Self as continuity of consciousness]:

5513 Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke]
1345 Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke]
6139 Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke]
1197 No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke]
1364 Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke]
12511 If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke]
1361 If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke]
21326 Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke]
1387 Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke]
21314 Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler]
21312 Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume]
21321 Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
21324 If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
21325 Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
21327 If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
1366 If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
21452 I can only determine my existence in time via external things [Kant]
5582 As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant]
5327 Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
1396 We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers]