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Full Idea
We can distinguish Identifying Reductionism (as in 'persons are bodies'), or Constitutive Reductionism (as in 'persons are distinct, but consist of thoughts etc.'), or Eliminative Reductionism (as in 'there are no persons, only thoughts etc.').
Gist of Idea
Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination
Source
report of Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.295) by PG - Db (ideas)
Book Ref
'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Martin,R /Barresi,J [Blackwells 2003], p.295
A Reaction
Constitutive Reductionism seems the most common one, as in 'chemistry just consists of lots of complicated physics'. He doesn't mention bridge laws, which are presumably only required in more complicated cases of constitutive reduction.
| 3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
| 1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
| 1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
| 1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
| 9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |
| 5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
| 5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
| 5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
| 5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
| 5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
| 5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
| 5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
| 5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |