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Single Idea 5518

[filed under theme 16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self ]

Full Idea

It is quite uninteresting whether, with half its components replaced, I have the same audio system, and also whether I exist if half of my body were simultaneously replaced.

Gist of Idea

It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system)

Source

Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.302)

Book Ref

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Martin,R /Barresi,J [Blackwells 2003], p.302


A Reaction

It is impossible to deny this, if the part replaced is not the brain. My doubt about Parfit's thesis is that while I may not care whether some modified thing is still me, my lawyers and the police might be very concerned.


The 13 ideas from Derek Parfit

Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin]
If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit]
One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit]
Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit]
We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit]
Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit]
Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG]
It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit]
It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]