more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 5520

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness ]

Full Idea

If there is someone with my head and my brother's body, it is a merely verbal question whether that person will be me, and that is why, even if it won't be me, that doesn't matter. ..What matters is not identity, but the facts of which identity consists.

Gist of Idea

If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem

Source

Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.310)

Book Ref

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Martin,R /Barresi,J [Blackwells 2003], p.310


A Reaction

It strikes me that from the subjective psychological point of view identity is of little interest, but from the objective external viewpoint (e.g. the forensic one) such questions are highly significant, and rightly so.


The 5 ideas with the same theme [problems with the possibility of dividing consciousness or brain]:

If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel]
If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit]
It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]