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Full Idea
If the two halves of my brain are transplanted into different bodies just like mine, they cannot both be me, since that would make them the same person. ..But my relation to these two contains everything that matters, so identity is not what matters.
Gist of Idea
If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity
Source
Derek Parfit (The Unimportance of Identity [1995], p.314)
Book Ref
'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Martin,R /Barresi,J [Blackwells 2003], p.314
A Reaction
I challenge his concept of what 'matters'. He has a rather solipsistic view of the problem, and I take Parfit to be a rather unsociable person, since his friends and partner will be keenly interested in the identities of the new beings.
| 3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
| 1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
| 1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
| 1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
| 9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |
| 5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
| 5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
| 5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
| 5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
| 5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
| 5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
| 5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
| 5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |