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Single Idea 5541
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
]
Full Idea
It is clear that a sufficient and yet at the same time general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided.
Gist of Idea
A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided
Source
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B083/A59)
Book Ref
Kant,Immanuel: 'Critique of Pure Reason', ed/tr. Guyer,P /Wood,A W [CUO 1998], p.197
A Reaction
In relation to the quest of Sextus Empiricus to find the 'criterion' of knowledge, this makes Kant a sceptic. It certainly seems to rule out any foundationalist view of knowledge. (Clearly Kant believes that an account of knowledge is possible).
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[criticisms of existence of foundational beliefs]:
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16716
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It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain
[Anon (Par)]
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2235
|
There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference
[Hume]
|
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5541
|
A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided
[Kant]
|
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10486
|
If we are rebuilding our ship at sea, we should jettison some cargo
[Boolos on Neurath]
|
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8485
|
We must always rebuild our ship on the open sea; we can't reconstruct it properly in dry-dock
[Neurath]
|
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8792
|
Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what
[Sellars]
|
|
8802
|
Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them
[Davidson]
|
|
8825
|
It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data
[Kim]
|
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8799
|
If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations
[Sosa]
|
|
8795
|
Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error
[Sosa]
|
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2523
|
That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations
[Dennett]
|
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3699
|
The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements
[Bonjour]
|
|
2753
|
Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content
[Dancy,J]
|
|
3577
|
Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs
[Williams,M]
|
|
3576
|
Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security
[Williams,M]
|
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6363
|
Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
|
3754
|
Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic
[Bernecker/Dretske]
|
|
10339
|
Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time
[Kusch]
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