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Full Idea
Concerning the mere form of cognition (setting aside all content), it is equally clear that a logic, so far as it expounds the general and necessary rules of understanding, must present criteria of truth in these very rules.
Gist of Idea
There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic
Source
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B084/A59)
Book Ref
Kant,Immanuel: 'Critique of Pure Reason', ed/tr. Guyer,P /Wood,A W [CUO 1998], p.197
A Reaction
A vital point, used by Putnam (Idea 2332) in his critique of machine functionalism. It is hard to see how we can think of logic as pure syntax if the concept of truth is needed. We may observe one Venn circle inside another, but interpretaton is required.
Related Idea
Idea 2332 Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam]
| 5542 | There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant] |
| 10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
| 10613 | No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P] |
| 10819 | Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H] |
| 9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
| 10892 | We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo] |