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Single Idea 5606

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation ]

Full Idea

Are freedom and natural necessity contradictory in an action? We have shown that freedom can relate to conditions of a kind entirely different from those in natural necessity, so each is independent of the other.

Gist of Idea

Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions

Source

Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B585/A557)

Book Ref

Kant,Immanuel: 'Critique of Pure Reason', ed/tr. Guyer,P /Wood,A W [CUO 1998], p.545


A Reaction

I'm not sure I understand this, but I suspect that it means that a serious case of kleptomania while never provide even the hint of an excuse for a minor theft. We're all free, and that's that. I am dubious.


The 12 ideas with the same theme [way in which thought causes events]:

Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes]
Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant]
Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim]
Experiment requires mental causation [Kim]
Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim]
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau]
Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan]
If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil]