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Single Idea 5638

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique ]

Full Idea

The proposition 'I think' was useless to Spinoza, because it expresses a merely contingent proposition, where certainty must be founded in necessity, and because it refers to the first person, when truth comes from rising above our own mentality.

Gist of Idea

'I think' is useless, because it is contingent, and limited to the first person

Source

report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.5

Book Ref

Scruton,Roger: 'A Short History of Modern Philosophy' [ARK 1985], p.51


A Reaction

I find both of these criticisms very appealing. One might simply say that the starting point of philosophy is not the process of thinking, but the contents of thinking. Descartes' move is like astronomers becoming obsessed with telescopes.


The 33 ideas with the same theme [objections to the necessary existence of a thinker]:

The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes]
It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes]
The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes]
'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes]
A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes]
That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes]
Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes]
The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes]
How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes]
My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes]
We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes]
The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes]
The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes]
Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes]
Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe]
Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes]
'I think' is useless, because it is contingent, and limited to the first person [Spinoza, by Scruton]
I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz]
The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz]
I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz]
'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise) [Kant]
The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche]
Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind [Nietzsche]
If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger]
The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre]
The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre]
Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre]
To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer]
'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer]
Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer]
Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe]
Barman to Descartes: Would you like another drink?... [Sommers,W]
There was a young student called Fred... [Sommers,W]