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Full Idea
Normally we identify experiences in terms of the persons whose experiences they are; but this will lead to a vicious circle if persons themselves are to be analysed in terms of their experiences.
Gist of Idea
We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences
Source
A.J. Ayer (The Concept of a Person [1963], §I)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'The Concept of a Person etc' [Macmillan 1973], p.84
A Reaction
This (from a leading empiricist) is a nice basic challenge to all empiricist accounts of personal identity. One might respond my saying that the circle is not vicious. There are two interlinked concepts (experience and persons), like day and night.
| 5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
| 5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
| 5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
| 5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
| 5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
| 5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
| 5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |