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Single Idea 5662

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds ]

Full Idea

Some people hold that no inductive argument can give us any reason to believe in the existence of something which could not even in principle be observed.

Gist of Idea

Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable

Source

A.J. Ayer (The Concept of a Person [1963], §I)

Book Ref

Ayer,A.J.: 'The Concept of a Person etc' [Macmillan 1973], p.87


A Reaction

I see nothing illogical in inferring the existence of a poltergeist from the recurrent flight of objects around my lounge. Only an excessive empiricism (which used to afflict Ayer) could lead to this claim.


The 6 ideas with the same theme [doubts about knowledge of other minds]:

If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius]
A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre]
We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre]
Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer]
If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]