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Full Idea
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word 'pain' means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalise from the one case so irresponsibly?
Gist of Idea
It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §293)
Book Ref
Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Philosophical Investigations', ed/tr. Anscombe,E. [Blackwell 1972], p.100
A Reaction
This is the best known objection to Mill's Argument from Analogy for other minds. It appears to be induction from a single instance. The better approach seems to be ABduction (best explanation), in which my own case is just some evidence.
| 3537 | I judge others' feeling by analogy with my body and behaviour [Mill] |
| 5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
| 5663 | It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein] |
| 19272 | To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein] |
| 14644 | If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm] |
| 9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P] |
| 15495 | Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB] |
| 3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
| 2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
| 2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
| 7091 | The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling] |
| 3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |