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Full Idea
It may not make sense to talk of states of consciousness except as the experiences of some conscious subject; and it may well be that this conscious subject can not be identified except by reference to his body.
Gist of Idea
Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects
Source
A.J. Ayer (The Concept of a Person [1963], §IV)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'The Concept of a Person etc' [Macmillan 1973], p.113
A Reaction
It strikes me that Ayer deserves more credit as a pioneer of this view. It tracks back to what may turn out to be the key difficulty for Descartes - how do you individuate a mental substance? I may identify me, but how do I identify you?
| 1372 | Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke] |
| 1378 | My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke] |
| 22865 | Habits constitute the self [Dewey] |
| 5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| 6381 | The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger] |