more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 5664
[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
]
Full Idea
It may not make sense to talk of states of consciousness except as the experiences of some conscious subject; and it may well be that this conscious subject can not be identified except by reference to his body.
Gist of Idea
Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects
Source
A.J. Ayer (The Concept of a Person [1963], §IV)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'The Concept of a Person etc' [Macmillan 1973], p.113
A Reaction
It strikes me that Ayer deserves more credit as a pioneer of this view. It tracks back to what may turn out to be the key difficulty for Descartes - how do you individuate a mental substance? I may identify me, but how do I identify you?
The
85 ideas
from A.J. Ayer
6973
|
Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct
[Ayer]
|
6968
|
Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort
[Ayer]
|
6969
|
Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them
[Ayer]
|
6970
|
Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern
[Ayer]
|
6971
|
I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval
[Ayer]
|
6972
|
A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by
[Ayer]
|
6974
|
Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy
[Ayer]
|
5322
|
Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership
[Ayer]
|
5325
|
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject?
[Ayer]
|
5326
|
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements
[Ayer]
|
5324
|
Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity
[Ayer]
|
5327
|
Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories
[Ayer]
|
5329
|
Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation!
[Ayer]
|
5328
|
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds
[Ayer]
|
5330
|
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events
[Ayer]
|
2613
|
The theory of other minds has no rival
[Ayer]
|
5331
|
You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does
[Ayer]
|
16520
|
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual
[Ayer]
|
2611
|
It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence
[Ayer]
|
2610
|
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences
[Ayer]
|
5661
|
We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences
[Ayer]
|
5662
|
Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable
[Ayer]
|
5664
|
Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects
[Ayer]
|
5668
|
People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body
[Ayer]
|
5666
|
Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress
[Ayer]
|
5665
|
Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences
[Ayer]
|
5669
|
Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them
[Ayer]
|
8824
|
No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940
[Ayer, by Kim]
|
15251
|
The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity
[Ayer]
|
5162
|
Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements'
[Ayer]
|
5163
|
Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable
[Ayer]
|
5164
|
A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it
[Ayer]
|
5165
|
Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement
[Ayer]
|
5166
|
The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition
[Ayer]
|
5167
|
The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic
[Ayer]
|
5168
|
Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions
[Ayer]
|
6524
|
Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions
[Ayer, by Robinson,H]
|
4729
|
Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic
[O'Grady on Ayer]
|
6525
|
Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door'
[Robinson,H on Ayer]
|
6523
|
Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated
[Ayer, by Robinson,H]
|
7919
|
Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics
[Ayer, by Macdonald,C]
|
5179
|
Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle
[Ayer]
|
5183
|
Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable
[Ayer]
|
5180
|
All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses
[Ayer]
|
5185
|
It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience
[Ayer]
|
5181
|
A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition
[Ayer]
|
5184
|
Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences
[Ayer]
|
5186
|
Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions
[Ayer]
|
5187
|
When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists
[Ayer]
|
5190
|
The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past
[Ayer]
|
5191
|
We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular
[Ayer]
|
5193
|
Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables
[Ayer]
|
5198
|
We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things
[Ierubino on Ayer]
|
5197
|
By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction
[Ayer]
|
5195
|
Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration
[Ayer]
|
5196
|
Philosophy is a department of logic
[Ayer]
|
5189
|
Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical
[Ayer]
|
5202
|
Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological
[Ayer]
|
5200
|
The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge
[Ayer]
|
2619
|
Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry
[Ayer]
|
5199
|
Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths
[Ayer]
|
5204
|
To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology
[Ayer]
|
4749
|
We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted
[Ayer]
|
5207
|
If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism.
[Ayer]
|
5209
|
The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant
[Ayer]
|
5208
|
A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible.
[Ayer]
|
5205
|
Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions
[Ayer]
|
23725
|
Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism
[Ayer, by Smith,M]
|
5206
|
To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval
[Ayer]
|
5172
|
If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences
[Ayer]
|
5173
|
Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body
[Ayer]
|
5176
|
Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents
[Ayer]
|
5177
|
Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences
[Ayer]
|
5178
|
A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness
[Ayer]
|
5171
|
The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances'
[Ayer]
|
5169
|
My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage
[Ayer]
|
5170
|
Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents
[Ayer]
|
2614
|
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data
[Ayer]
|
2615
|
The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality
[Ayer]
|
19459
|
To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory
[Ayer]
|
19460
|
'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless
[Ayer]
|
19461
|
Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature
[Ayer]
|
19463
|
Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past
[Ayer]
|
19464
|
We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing
[Ayer]
|
19462
|
Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively
[Ayer]
|