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Single Idea 5676

[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection ]

Full Idea

As the word is normally used, it can't be said of me at all that I 'know' I am in pain; what is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain?

Gist of Idea

To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain

Source

Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §246)

Book Ref

Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Philosophical Investigations', ed/tr. Anscombe,E. [Blackwell 1972], p.89


A Reaction

This raises the question of whether self-consciousness implies self-knowledge, and suggests that it doesn't. All our normal talk of knowledge requires some sort of reliable justification of beliefs, and we can't drop that in the case of self-knowledge.


The 15 ideas with the same theme [learning about our minds by looking inwards]:

To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer]
Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]