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Single Idea 5678

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism ]

Full Idea

The scientific direct realist accepts the directness of our perception of the world, but restricts his realism to a special group of properties, ..not including those which are dependent for their existence upon the existence of a perceiver.

Gist of Idea

Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly

Source

Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.3)

Book Ref

Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.148


A Reaction

Dancy goes on to say that this distinction is a 'close relative' of Locke's primary/secondary distinction. Am I a direct realist or a representative realist about primary properties? Maybe the distinction dissolves as we unravel the true process.


The 16 ideas with the same theme [we are in direct contact with reality]:

A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas]
Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley]
The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid]
It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche]
I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell]
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell]
Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger]
Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J]
Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J]
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe]
Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson]
There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati]
Direct realism is false, because defeasibility questions are essential to perceptual knowledge [Galloway]