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Full Idea
Indirect realism holds that in perception we are indirectly aware of the physical objects around us in virtue of a direct awareness of internal, non-physical objects.
Clarification
'Indirect realism' is representative realism
Gist of Idea
Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects
Source
Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.4)
Book Ref
Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.152
A Reaction
This may be a slightly prejudicial definition which invites insoluble questions about the ontological status of the internal 'objects'. It seems to me obvious that we create some sort of inner 'models' or constructions in the process of perception.
| 1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6526 | Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H] |
| 21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
| 6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
| 5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
| 5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |