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Single Idea 5690
[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
]
Full Idea
For Armstrong, introspection involves a belief, and mental states and their accompanying beliefs are 'distinct existences', so a state without belief shows states are not self-intimating, and the belief without the state shows beliefs aren't infallible.
Clarification
'Self-intimation' is a mental state being obvious to its possessor
Gist of Idea
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility
Source
report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection
Book Ref
'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [Blackwell 1995], p.396
A Reaction
I agree with Armstrong. Introspection is a two-level activity, which animals probably can't do, and there is always the possibility of a mismatch between the two levels, so introspection is neither self-intimating nor infallibe (though incorrigible).
The
16 ideas
with the same theme
[learning about our minds by looking inwards]:
5676
|
To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain
[Wittgenstein]
|
24207
|
Observing oneself in the present is impossible, and oneself in the past may be wrong
[Weil]
|
5690
|
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility
[Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
|
5687
|
For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events?
[Shoemaker]
|
5688
|
Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible
[Shoemaker]
|
5803
|
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception
[Dretske]
|
5805
|
Introspection does not involve looking inwards
[Dretske]
|
5807
|
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting
[Dretske]
|
3467
|
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense
[Searle]
|
3483
|
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision
[Searle]
|
3422
|
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence
[Kim]
|
9328
|
All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them
[Lehrer]
|
8831
|
Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history
[Goldman]
|
2967
|
We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection
[Lockwood]
|
5692
|
Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves
[Rosenthal]
|
5670
|
Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents
[Cassam]
|