more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 5690

[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection ]

Full Idea

For Armstrong, introspection involves a belief, and mental states and their accompanying beliefs are 'distinct existences', so a state without belief shows states are not self-intimating, and the belief without the state shows beliefs aren't infallible.

Clarification

'Self-intimation' is a mental state being obvious to its possessor

Gist of Idea

A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility

Source

report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection

Book Ref

'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [Blackwell 1995], p.396


A Reaction

I agree with Armstrong. Introspection is a two-level activity, which animals probably can't do, and there is always the possibility of a mismatch between the two levels, so introspection is neither self-intimating nor infallibe (though incorrigible).


The 15 ideas with the same theme [learning about our minds by looking inwards]:

To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer]
Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]