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Full Idea
If a belief resting directly on the foundation of the senses is not valid, there will be no standard to which we can refer any doubt on obscure questions for rational confirmation.
Gist of Idea
The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses
Source
Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], I.422)
Book Ref
Lucretius: 'On the Nature of the Universe', ed/tr. Latham,Ronald [Penguin 1951], p.40
A Reaction
A classic statement of empiricist foundationalism. The Epicureans don't appear to have any time for a priori truths at all. I wonder if they settled mathematical disputes by counting objects and drawing diagrams?
| 5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
| 2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume] |
| 5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| 8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 8875 | Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B] |