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Single Idea 5713

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind ]

Full Idea

One can laugh without being composed of laughing particles, ..so why cannot the things that we see gifted with sensation be compounded of seeds that are wholly senseless?

Gist of Idea

You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds?

Source

Lucretius (On the Nature of the Universe [c.60 BCE], II.988)

Book Ref

Lucretius: 'On the Nature of the Universe', ed/tr. Latham,Ronald [Penguin 1951], p.89


A Reaction

Lovely argument! You might feel driven to panpsychism in your desperation to explain the 'weirdness' of consciousness, but it would be mad to attribute laughter to basic matter, so comedy has to 'emerge' at some point.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [all mental events can be explained physically]:

You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius]
We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau]
Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau]
Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan]
'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette]
Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R]
Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R]
We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination [Lavers]
Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them [Friend]