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Full Idea
In cases of 'de re' modality, it is a particular thing that has the property essentially or accidentally; where the modality attaches to the proposition, it is 'de dicto' - it is the whole truth that all bachelors are unmarried that is necessary.
Clarification
'De re' means concerning the thing; 'de dicto' means concerning the statement
Gist of Idea
'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions
Source
Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Melia,Joseph: 'Modality' [Acumen 2003], p.2
A Reaction
This seems to me one of the most important distinctions in metaphysics (as practised by analytical philosophers, who like distinctions). The first type leads off into the ontology, the second type veers towards epistemology.
Related Idea
Idea 13810 The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
| 5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
| 5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
| 5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
| 5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
| 5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
| 5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
| 5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
| 5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
| 5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
| 5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
| 5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
| 5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
| 5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
| 5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |
| 5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
| 5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
| 5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |