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Single Idea 5744

[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic ]

Full Idea

First-order predicate calculus is an extensional logic, while quantified modal logic is intensional (which has grave problems of interpretation, according to Quine).

Clarification

'Extensions' concern items in the world; 'intensions' concern internal meaning

Gist of Idea

First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious)

Source

Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.3)

Book Ref

Melia,Joseph: 'Modality' [Acumen 2003], p.63


A Reaction

The battle is over ontology. Quine wants the ontology to stick with the values of the variables (i.e. the items in the real world that are quantified over in the extension). The rival view arises from attempts to explain necessity and counterfactuals.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about the nature of modal logic]:

Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine]
Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine]
Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine]
It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett]
Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman]
Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta]
Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
Modal operators are usually treated as quantifiers [Shapiro]
Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen]
First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]
Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks]