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Single Idea 5749
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
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Full Idea
One can be a realist about possible worlds without adopting Lewis's extreme views; they might be abstract or mathematical entities; they might be sets of propositions or maximal uninstantiated properties; they might be like books or pictures.
Gist of Idea
Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books
Source
Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.6)
Book Ref
Melia,Joseph: 'Modality' [Acumen 2003], p.123
A Reaction
My intuition is that once you go down the road of realism about possible worlds, Lewis's full concrete realism looks at least as attractive as any of these options. You can discuss the 'average man' in an economic theory without realism.
The
17 ideas
from 'Modality'
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5732
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'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions
[Melia]
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5734
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Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives
[Melia]
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5742
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In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers
[Melia]
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5743
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If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal
[Melia]
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5738
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We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary?
[Melia]
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5737
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Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets
[Melia]
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5740
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Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position
[Melia]
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5741
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If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid
[Melia]
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5735
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Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact
[Melia]
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5739
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Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible
[Melia]
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5736
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No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly
[Melia]
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5744
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First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious)
[Melia]
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5746
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The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities
[Melia]
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5748
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We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility
[Melia]
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5750
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Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together
[Melia]
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5749
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Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books
[Melia]
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5751
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The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books
[Melia]
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