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Full Idea
Propositions are true at possible worlds in much the same way as they are true at books: by being implied by the book.
Gist of Idea
The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books
Source
Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.7)
Book Ref
Melia,Joseph: 'Modality' [Acumen 2003], p.155
A Reaction
An intriguing way to introduce the view that possible worlds should be seen as like books. The truth-makers of propositions about the actual world are items in it, but the truth-makers in novels (say) are the conditions of the whole work as united.
| 11964 | Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar] |
| 16285 | A possible world can be seen as a complete and consistent novel [Jeffrey] |
| 11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
| 16286 | Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis] |
| 16287 | Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis] |
| 9662 | Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis] |
| 19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
| 5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |