more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 5770
[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
]
Full Idea
If there is no free will, then in vain is reward offered to the good and punishment to the bad, because they have not been deserved by any free and willed movement of the mind.
Gist of Idea
Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind
Source
Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.III)
Book Ref
Boethius: 'The Consolations of Philosophy', ed/tr. Watts,V.E. [Penguin 1969], p.153
A Reaction
I just don't see why decisions have to come out of nowhere in order to have any merit. People are different from natural forces, because the former can be persuaded by reasons. A moral agent is a mechanism which decides according to reasons.
The
24 ideas
from Boethius
|
15035
|
If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction
[Boethius, by Panaccio]
|
|
23308
|
Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity
[Boethius, by Sorabji]
|
|
5752
|
Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't?
[Boethius]
|
|
5753
|
The regular events of this life could never be due to chance
[Boethius]
|
|
5754
|
You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions
[Boethius]
|
|
5756
|
Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired
[Boethius]
|
|
5757
|
God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God
[Boethius]
|
|
5758
|
God is the good
[Boethius]
|
|
5759
|
Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify
[Boethius]
|
|
5760
|
The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God'
[Boethius]
|
|
5761
|
God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing
[Boethius]
|
|
5763
|
The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural
[Boethius]
|
|
5762
|
The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it
[Boethius]
|
|
5764
|
When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature
[Boethius]
|
|
5765
|
The reward of the good is to become gods
[Boethius]
|
|
5766
|
If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere
[Boethius]
|
|
16692
|
Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life
[Boethius]
|
|
5767
|
Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement
[Boethius]
|
|
5768
|
God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will
[Boethius]
|
|
5769
|
Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge?
[Boethius]
|
|
5770
|
Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind
[Boethius]
|
|
5771
|
Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different
[Boethius]
|
|
14665
|
We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses
[Boethius]
|
|
16661
|
There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things
[Boethius]
|