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Single Idea 5776

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions ]

Full Idea

A proposition may be defined as: what we believe when we believe truly or falsely.

Gist of Idea

A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely

Source

Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], p.285)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Logic and Knowledge', ed/tr. Marsh,Robert Charles [Routledge 1956], p.285


A Reaction

If we define belief as 'commitment to truth', Russell's last six words become redundant. "Propositions are the contents of beliefs", it being beliefs which are candidates for truth, not propositions. (Russell agrees, on p.308!)

Related Idea

Idea 20311 An idea involves affirmation or negation [Spinoza]


The 33 ideas with the same theme [ideas that exist independently from any language]:

A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus]
Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter]
Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche]
Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell]
If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell]
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell]
A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein]
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer]
We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett]
'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman]
We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette]
Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
A proposition objectifies what a sentence says, as indicative, with secure references [Read]
Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber]
Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall]
There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M]
'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]