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Single Idea 5778

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique ]

Full Idea

If privacy is the main objection to introspective data, we shall have to include among such data all sensations; a toothache, for example, is essentially private; a dentist may see the bad condition of your tooth, but does not feel your ache.

Gist of Idea

If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches

Source

Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Logic and Knowledge', ed/tr. Marsh,Robert Charles [Routledge 1956], p.294


A Reaction

Russell was perhaps the first to see why eliminative behaviourism is a non-starter as a theory of mind. Mental states are clearly a cause of behaviour, so they can't be the same thing. We might 'eliminate' mental states by reducing them, though.


The 25 ideas with the same theme [reasons why behaviourism is false]:

Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach]
Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle]
Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle]
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle]
What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim]
Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim]
Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim]
Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim]
Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor]
The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood]
Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment [Rey]
How are stimuli and responses 'similar'? [Rey]
Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind [Rey]
Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan]
Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton]
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil]
You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
How do behaviourists greet each other? [Sommers,W]