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Full Idea
If privacy is the main objection to introspective data, we shall have to include among such data all sensations; a toothache, for example, is essentially private; a dentist may see the bad condition of your tooth, but does not feel your ache.
Gist of Idea
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches
Source
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Logic and Knowledge', ed/tr. Marsh,Robert Charles [Routledge 1956], p.294
A Reaction
Russell was perhaps the first to see why eliminative behaviourism is a non-starter as a theory of mind. Mental states are clearly a cause of behaviour, so they can't be the same thing. We might 'eliminate' mental states by reducing them, though.
| 5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
| 5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
| 5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
| 5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
| 5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
| 5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
| 5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
| 5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
| 5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |