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Single Idea 5779
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
]
Full Idea
There do seem to be psychological and physical causal laws which are distinct from each other.
Gist of Idea
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws
Source
Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Logic and Knowledge', ed/tr. Marsh,Robert Charles [Routledge 1956], p.299
A Reaction
This sounds like the essence of 'property dualism'. Reductive physicalists (like myself) say there is no distinction. Davidson, usually considered a property dualist, claims there are no psycho-physical laws. Russell notes that reduction may be possible.
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[mind is a non-reducible physical property]:
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5779
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There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws
[Russell]
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2587
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Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts
[Putnam]
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3405
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If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties
[Davidson, by Kim]
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3966
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The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism
[Davidson]
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3453
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Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism
[Searle]
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3455
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Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling
[Searle]
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3456
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Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property
[Searle]
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3475
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Property dualism denies reductionism
[Searle]
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3376
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We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
[Kim]
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3424
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Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists
[Kim]
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2489
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Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
[Fodor]
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2985
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Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"?
[Lyons on Fodor]
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4070
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Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance
[Crane]
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2406
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H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that
[Chalmers]
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4593
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'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
[Heil]
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6622
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Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain
[Lowe]
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3520
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Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical
[Maslin]
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