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Single Idea 5779

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism ]

Full Idea

There do seem to be psychological and physical causal laws which are distinct from each other.

Gist of Idea

There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws

Source

Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Logic and Knowledge', ed/tr. Marsh,Robert Charles [Routledge 1956], p.299


A Reaction

This sounds like the essence of 'property dualism'. Reductive physicalists (like myself) say there is no distinction. Davidson, usually considered a property dualist, claims there are no psycho-physical laws. Russell notes that reduction may be possible.


The 9 ideas from 'On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning'

If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]