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Full Idea
A system is either conscious or it isn't, but within the field of consciousness there are states of intensity ranging from drowsiness to full awareness.
Gist of Idea
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot
Source
John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'The Mystery of Consciousness' [Granta 1997], p.5
A Reaction
I think this all-or-nothing view is the last vestiges of Cartesian dualism, and is quite wrong. Heaps of neuroscience (about blindsight, subliminal awareness, neurosis etc.) says we will never understand the mind if we think it is only the conscious part.
| 5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
| 5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
| 5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
| 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
| 5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
| 5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
| 5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
| 5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
| 5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
| 5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
| 5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
| 5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
| 5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |