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Single Idea 5795

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness ]

Full Idea

There are not two kinds of consciousness, an information-processing consciousness that is amenable to scientific investigation and a phenomenal, what-it-subjectively-feels-like form of consciousness that will forever remain mysterious.

Gist of Idea

There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't

Source

John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Concl.1)

Book Ref

Searle,John R.: 'The Mystery of Consciousness' [Granta 1997], p.200

A Reaction

Fodor appears to be the main target of this remark. The view that we can explain intentionality but not qualia is currently very fashionable. I am sympathetic to Searle here. Consciousness isn't an epiphenomenon, it is essential to all thought.

The 21 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about consciousness]:

7995 In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
19354 Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins]
23658 Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid]
4166 A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer]
23872 'Society determines consciousness' is contradictory; society only exists in minds [Weil on Marx/Engels]
5277 Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [Marx/Engels]
19626 Our instincts had to be blunted and diminished, to make way for consciousness! [Cioran]
21941 Unlike Marxists, Foucault explains thought internally, without deference to conscious ideas [Foucault, by Gutting]
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
4884 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
2528 Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
7367 Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett]
7393 We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett]
4880 Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett]
7854 Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau]
7889 Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau]
7891 We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau]
4621 Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil]
6668 If the present does not exist, then consciousness must be memory of the immediate past [Marshall]