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Single Idea 5796

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique ]

Full Idea

You could say that tree-rings contain information about the age of a tree, but you could as well say that the age of a tree in years contains information about the number of rings in a tree stump. ..'Information' is not a real causal feature of the world.

Gist of Idea

If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings

Source

John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Concl 2.5)

Book Ref

Searle,John R.: 'The Mystery of Consciousness' [Granta 1997], p.206

A Reaction

A nice point for fans of 'information' to ponder. However, you cannot deny the causal connection between the age and the rings. Information has a subjective aspect, but you cannot, for example, eliminate the role of DNA in making organisms.

The 14 ideas with the same theme [attempts to prove that mind is not just physical]:

1909 How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus]
5885 Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls [Cicero]
5951 If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch]
6229 Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth]
6382 The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger]
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
2308 Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
3002 If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor]
6122 No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]
3150 Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience? [Rey]
3129 Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance [Rey]
4072 The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane]
4598 Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil]
3448 Do new ideas increase the weight of the brain? [Dance]