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Single Idea 5800

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism ]

Full Idea

My thesis is that all mental facts are representational facts, and that all representational facts are facts about informational functions.

Gist of Idea

All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions

Source

Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], Prol)

Book Ref

Dretske,Fred: 'Naturalizing the Mind' [MIT 1997], p.-4


A Reaction

The first half of the thesis seems a bit difficult to disagree with, but that a fact is 'represented' may not be the essence of that fact. The biggest mystery is the content, not its representation. And everything is 'information' about everything else.


The 18 ideas from Fred Dretske

Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]
You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose]
A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske]
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske]
Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske]
All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]