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Full Idea
My thesis is that all mental facts are representational facts, and that all representational facts are facts about informational functions.
Gist of Idea
All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions
Source
Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], Prol)
Book Ref
Dretske,Fred: 'Naturalizing the Mind' [MIT 1997], p.-4
A Reaction
The first half of the thesis seems a bit difficult to disagree with, but that a fact is 'represented' may not be the essence of that fact. The biggest mystery is the content, not its representation. And everything is 'information' about everything else.
| 5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
| 5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
| 5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
| 5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
| 5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
| 5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
| 5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
| 5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
| 5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
| 5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |