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Full Idea
Representations are in the head, but their content is not; in this sense, the mind isn't in the head any more than stories (i.e. story contents) are in books.
Gist of Idea
Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books
Source
Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §1.6)
Book Ref
Dretske,Fred: 'Naturalizing the Mind' [MIT 1997], p.38
A Reaction
This is the final consequence of Putnam's idea that meanings ain't in the head. Intentionality is an extraordinary bridge between the brain and the external world. The ontology of stories, and musical compositions, is one philosophy's deepest problems.
| 5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
| 5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
| 5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
| 5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
| 5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
| 5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
| 5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
| 5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
| 5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
| 5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |