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Single Idea 5803

[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection ]

Full Idea

On a representational theory of the mind, introspection becomes an instance of displaced perception - knowledge of internal (mental) facts via an awareness of external (physical) objects.

Gist of Idea

In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception

Source

Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2)

Book Ref

Dretske,Fred: 'Naturalizing the Mind' [MIT 1997], p.40

A Reaction

This sounds close to a behaviourist (e.g. Ryle) account of introspection, via observing one's own behaviour. The word 'displaced' is an easy one, concealing a multitude of questions.

The 15 ideas with the same theme [learning about our minds by looking inwards]:

5676 To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
5690 A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
5687 For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
5688 Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
5803 In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
5805 Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
5807 Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
3467 Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
3483 Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
3422 Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
9328 All conscious states can be immediately known when attention is directed to them [Lehrer]
8831 Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
2967 We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
5692 Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal]
5670 Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam]