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Full Idea
On a representational theory of the mind, introspection becomes an instance of displaced perception - knowledge of internal (mental) facts via an awareness of external (physical) objects.
Gist of Idea
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception
Source
Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2)
Book Ref
Dretske,Fred: 'Naturalizing the Mind' [MIT 1997], p.40
A Reaction
This sounds close to a behaviourist (e.g. Ryle) account of introspection, via observing one's own behaviour. The word 'displaced' is an easy one, concealing a multitude of questions.
| 5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
| 5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
| 5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
| 5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
| 5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
| 5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
| 5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
| 5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
| 5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
| 5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |