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Full Idea
Introspection has no phenomenology or, if it does, it always has the same phenomenology as the experience one is introspecting.
Clarification
'Phenomenology' is what-it-is-like
Gist of Idea
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting
Source
Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2.4)
Book Ref
Dretske,Fred: 'Naturalizing the Mind' [MIT 1997], p.62
A Reaction
There is a difference between looking at a tree, and being aware of yourself looking at a tree. You can be faintly depressed, and then become aware that you are faintly depressed. He is nearly right.
5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
5802 | Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske] |
5805 | Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske] |
5803 | In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske] |
5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
5807 | Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske] |
5808 | Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske] |
5809 | Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske] |
5800 | All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske] |