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Full Idea
For Russell there is a logical entailment: 'the x is F' entails 'there exists one and only one x'. Whether or not this is true of the attributive use of definite descriptions, it does not seem true of the referential use. The existence is a presumption.
Gist of Idea
'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence
Source
Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966], §VI)
Book Ref
'Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds', ed/tr. Schwartz,Stephen P. [Cornell 1979], p.54
A Reaction
Can we say 'x does not exist, but x is F'? Strictly, that sounds to me more like a contradiction than a surprising rejection of a presumption. However, 'Father Xmas does not exist, but he has a red coat'.
| 7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
| 10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
| 10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
| 5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
| 5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
| 5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
| 5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
| 5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |