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Single Idea 5822

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference ]

Full Idea

Kripke has mislocated the important causal relation, which lies between the item's states and doings and the speaker's body of information - not between the item's being dubbed with a name and the speaker's contemporary use of it.

Gist of Idea

The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information

Source

comment on Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Gareth Evans - The Causal Theory of Names §I

Book Ref

'Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds', ed/tr. Schwartz,Stephen P. [Cornell 1979], p.204


A Reaction

This feels sort of right. I sympathise with the much more social view of matters like reference, which grows out of Wittgenstein's anti-private language claims. I'm not sure where 'causation' come into Evans's picture.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [reference fixed by a causal link to something]:

The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein]
I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]
A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey]
If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey]
Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]
Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara]
Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery]
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]