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Full Idea
In general, a speaker intends to refer to the item that is the dominant source of his associated body of information.
Gist of Idea
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information
Source
Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II)
Book Ref
Evans,Gareth: 'Collected Papers' [OUP 1985], p.17
A Reaction
This sounds like a theory of reference which fully preserves the spirit of traditional empiricism. Speakers refer to ideas which connect to the source of their underlying impressions.
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |