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Single Idea 5874

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character ]

Full Idea

The virtues of character belong to the part that is non-rational, but whose nature is to follow the rational part; we do not say what a man's character is like when we say that he is wise or clever, but when we say that he is gentle or daring.

Gist of Idea

Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part

Source

Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1220a11)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Eudemian Ethics I,II and VIII', ed/tr. Woods,Michael [OUP 1992], p.14

A Reaction

In the Nichomachean Ethics it appears that good character is the 'harmony' between the two parts; here it sounds more like obedience. It seems to me that our rational part is a failure if it is not sensitive to the needs of the irrational part.

The 44 ideas from 'Eudemian Ethics'

5865 Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle]
5866 It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle]
18230 No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
5868 Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle]
5869 The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]
5870 Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle]
5871 Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle]
5872 Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle]
5873 Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle]
20204 Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle]
5874 Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle]
5875 Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle]
22504 Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle]
22505 The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle]
22506 A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle]
22507 An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle]
23319 We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
22508 Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle]
22509 What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle]
22512 Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle]
22513 Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle]
22510 Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle]
22514 The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle]
22515 Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle]
22516 Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle]
5876 Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle]
22517 We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle]
5877 We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle]
23905 Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle]
23906 Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle]
23908 If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle]
23909 Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle]
23910 Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle]
23911 Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle]
23912 Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle]
23913 Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle]
23914 People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle]
23917 Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle]
23918 Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle]
23919 Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle]
23920 Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle]
23915 The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle]
23916 The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle]
5878 Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle]