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Single Idea 5916

[filed under theme 25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights ]

Full Idea

A 'right' does not stand for a purely moral notion; it began, I suppose, by standing for a legal notion, and its usage has broadened out so as to include certain things that cannot be claimed at law, but it is not yet correlative to duty.

Clarification

'Correlative' means 'precisely corresponding'

Gist of Idea

Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things

Source

W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II App I)

Book Ref

Ross,W.David: 'The Right and the Good' [OUP 1930], p.53

A Reaction

Presumably 'natural rights' are those which ought to be legal rights - or they are so obvious that there is no point in discussing legal rights until the natural rights are granted. Don't we make laws because we perceive rights?

The 40 ideas from W. David Ross

7259 Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J]
5898 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross]
5899 If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
5904 In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross]
5900 We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross]
5913 The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross]
5911 Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross]
5914 An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross]
5910 The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross]
5905 We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross]
5906 Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross]
5908 Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross]
5909 Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG]
5912 We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross]
5916 Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross]
5915 Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross]
5917 People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross]
5921 We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross]
5922 An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross]
5926 The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross]
5927 I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross]
5924 Identical objects must have identical value [Ross]
5928 Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross]
5920 Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross]
5923 The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross]
5918 The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross]
5919 Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross]
5930 All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross]
5933 Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross]
5932 The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross]
5929 No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross]
5931 All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross]
5939 Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross]
5938 Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
5937 The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross]
5936 Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross]
5940 Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross]
5941 Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross]
5942 We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross]
18622 Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross]