more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 5920

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value ]

Full Idea

For most theories of value may be divided into those which treat it as a quality and those which treat it as a relation between that which has value and something else, usually a state of mind.

Gist of Idea

Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind)

Source

W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV)

Book Ref

Ross,W.David: 'The Right and the Good' [OUP 1930], p.75

A Reaction

We might say that a leaf only has value to a tree (which has no mind). Presumably if value is a relation to a mind, it can be further reduced to being an object of desire, but this will give class A drugs a greater value than a beautiful deed.

The 40 ideas from 'The Right and the Good'

7259 Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J]
5898 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross]
5899 If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
5904 In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross]
5900 We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross]
5913 The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross]
5911 Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross]
5914 An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross]
5910 The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross]
5905 We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross]
5906 Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross]
5908 Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross]
5909 Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG]
5912 We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross]
5916 Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross]
5915 Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross]
5917 People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross]
5921 We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross]
5922 An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross]
5926 The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross]
5927 I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross]
5924 Identical objects must have identical value [Ross]
5928 Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross]
5920 Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross]
5923 The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross]
5918 The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross]
5919 Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross]
5930 All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross]
5933 Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross]
5932 The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross]
5929 No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross]
5931 All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross]
5939 Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross]
5938 Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
5937 The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross]
5936 Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross]
5940 Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross]
5941 Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross]
5942 We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross]
18622 Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross]