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Full Idea
The sensum-theory seems to me less probable than a causal theory of perception, which regards sensuous experience as not being apprehension at all, but a set of mental events produced by external bodies on our bodies and minds.
Gist of Idea
I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions
Source
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV)
Book Ref
Ross,W.David: 'The Right and the Good' [OUP 1930], p.127
A Reaction
The point is that there is no third item between the object and the mind, which has to be 'apprehended'. Sense-data give a good account of delusions (where we apprehend the 'data', but not the real object). I think I agree with Ross.
| 5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
| 5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
| 3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
| 2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
| 2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
| 7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
| 6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
| 3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |